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A great deal of space in communication journals and introductory textbook chapters has been devoted to the questions of what communication is and how its domain is to be defined. The consideration and resolution of such issues is essential if the communication scholar hopes to be able to study this phenomenon and conduct effective empirical research in this field. A more fundamental issue, however, which can implicitly or explicitly influence the type of research questions that are asked is the issue of why people communicate. What function does and did communication serve for human beings that caused it be selected for during the process of evolution? Is communication first and foremost a derivative of social interaction or is it, instead, a result of the cognitive needs of the individual?

The answers one arrives at for these questions will depend to a great extent upon the view of causality which one adopts as an overarching framework. Arguments over the nature of causality, its definition, or whether it even exists have raged for centuries. In order to understand the conception of causality which seems to guide most communication and social science researchers today, it is first necessary to examine the debate on causality which has been a recurrent theme throughout the history of science and philosophy.

There are two broad views of causality which have been advanced and which operate from different metaphysical assumptions. The generative theory of causality traces its roots back to Plato and Aristotle while the successionist theory of causality arose originally from ideas expressed in the works of older Greek thinkers such as Heraclitus.

The generative theory of causality begins with the premise that a cause generates an effect and has a real connection to that effect. A cause and its effect are not independent of each other. This relationship is internal to the event and arises from some mechanism linking the cause to the effect. Given that no other factors intervene between them, a particular effect must, by necessity, result from a specific cause.

In contrast to this position, the successionist theory of causality holds that a cause is nothing more than something which usually or statistically often occurs before some observed event or happening. The cause and effect are independent of one another. Any connection which exists between them is merely the result of our psychological processes and has no basis in reality. Causes and effects are not linked empirically and are nothing more than happenings which have no logical connection with one another. It is, therefore, not possible to infer from any given state to another state which might occur in the future.

The successionist view of causality considers entities to be passive. Since it considers cause and effect relationships to be merely actions resulting in other actions, the specific identity of the things involved is irrelevant. In contrast, the generative view holds that the nature of the entities involved determine what specifically will happen in a given set of circumstances.

The generative and successionist views of causality represent divergent orientations to things in the world and to the events that we observe which involve those things. As mentioned previously, the position one takes on these issues can have a profound influence on the kinds of questions one asks and the kind of research one will conduct. The practical implications which result from one's decisions in this arena come implicitly or explicitly from the philosophy one adopts. To better understand the philosophical underpinnings of current practitioners in the field of communication and the social sciences, it is important to trace the historical pathway science has travelled to reach its present perception of the nature of causality.

In the fifth and sixth centuries B. C., the Greek thinker, Heraclitus, developed the notion that change is the only constant in the universe. Things which exist are continually being transformed into their opposites. Opposed motions and forces work against one another and preclude the stability of any material objects. It was ideas such as these that Galileo used in his later reconceptualization of the nature of cause and effect relationships.

The two most influential Greek philosophers were Plato (428-348 B.C.) and Aristotle (384-322 B. C.). For Plato, Idea, or the non-perceivable, innate Being of true reality, was the cause of occurrence and change. All phenomena of change existed for the sake of Idea. This notion of Idea as a final cause led to Plato's teleological metaphysics which was a nonmechanical explanation of the world. It also formed the roots for Aristotle's work on causality.

Though he was in many ways a Platonist in this area, Aristotle believed that there was a relationship between Idea and phenomena, that is, that a connection existed between the general and the particular. The recognition of this relationship was a central task for logical deduction. Aristotle set forth four types of causes: the material cause (what something is made of), the motive or efficient cause (the agent who acts on that thing), the formal cause (the form into which the thing is changed), and the final cause (the purpose or desired goal for which something is done).

For this discussion, however, the most relevant principles or basic axioms recognized by Aristotle were the Law of Identity (A is A), the Law of Noncontradiction (A cannot both be A and not be A), and the Law of Excluded Middle (either A or not A). Of these three laws, the Law of Identity applied to action leads to the law of causality. As opposed to Plato, Aristotle held that reality consists only of the particular, that is, only entities exist. These entities also include all of their attributes, whether actual or potential. By the Law of Identity, a thing is what it is. Its nature determines what is possible for it to do and what is not possible for it to do in any given set of circumstances. In consequence of their identity, entities follow certain laws of action and have no alternative to doing so. In other words, entities can act consistently but not in contradiction to their identities. In this conception, causality is seen as a relationship between entities and their actions. Motion is a quality or attribute of some object which cannot exist apart from that object.

This was the predominant view of causality which held sway in science until the time of Galileo: effects were seen either as the activities of causes or other things which resulted from these activities. Galileo (1564-1642) turned away from this Aristotelian view and reconceptualized causes and effects not as substances or things but as motions. Causality became a mathematical quality that could be measured. To accomplish this quantification, Galileo disregarded the attributes of the objects he was looking at and focused solely on their positions as they varied across time. He connected cause and effect relationships only to the motions or states of things and not to the things themselves. The concept of causality as arising from the metaphysical identity of the objects in question was abandoned.

This position was taken even farther by David Hume (1711-1776) who originated the use of the term succession in regard to causality. Hume echoed the position taken by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) who believed that motion was the defining characteristic of the universe. Hume went so far as to call into question the validity of the very concept of causality. For him, so-called cause and effect were only the result of our imagination. Causation was a psychological, subjective explanation of our experience of the constant conjunctions of the various actions which we observed. To Hume, there were no logically necessary connections between causes and effects. Causes merely occur prior to and contiguous with effects. The relationship is not one between facts but between experiences.

Hume further said that there is no uniformity of nature across time or space. As with the idea of causality, any such conclusion on the part of people is the result of habit and not something which is empirically verifiable. In Hume's view, science can make only historical statements about what has happened and can make no predictions about subsequent events. Every new occurrence has the same probability as any other. Hume suggests, however, that people should proceed as a matter of practical requirement to act as though past experiences can somehow be relevant to what may occur in the future. Such inferences are to be justified only by the successful results of the guesses which people make and not by any evidence that someone might logically try to invoke.

These ideas about causality and the nature of science became further entrenched by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kant realized that the science of Isaac Newton rested upon the objective principle of cause and effect. Kant saw this as a contradiction to the skepticism of Hume and believed that philosophy must choose between the two points of view. Kant sought to resolve this conflict by stating that the world exists only to the extent that humans participate in constructing it. The objects people observe are determined by the knowledge of those people rather than that knowledge being determined by the object. People can become aware only of the phenomenal world, not the true, noumenal existence of reality as it truly is. Man's phenomenal self is subject to cause and effect but his spiritual, noumenal self is bound by nothing except its own choices.

In Kant's view, causality is a condition of existence. It is a category or rule which cannot be experienced but which exists in people's minds and which gives order to data that we think about. The principle of causality is necessarily true, but the source of that necessity does not reside in the nature of the objects involved but in the way our minds are structured.

By ignoring Aristotle's application of the Law of Identity to actions, causality was divorced from any direct connection to material substances. Science came to view actions (including those of people) as reactions to some previous action or motion or force. As Hume demonstrated, if this view is accepted, one cannot prove or validate the law of causality. Without a recognition of the relationship of causality to the Law of Identity, there is no way to establish any necessary connections between successive events.

In the realm of human action, a motion-to-motion view can result in predictive knowledge about behavior but removes the explanatory benefits of the law of causality. If one ignores the properties of entities (in this case, people), that is, their nature according to the Law of Identity, one cannot reach an understanding of why they behave as they do. As Nathaniel Branden (1969) states, "Man's consciousness...has a specific nature... structure...attributes...(and) powers.... Its manner of functioning exhibits specific principles.... His mind is an organ over which man has a specific, delimited regulatory control.... (He) cannot alter or infringe the psychological laws by which his mind functions" (p. 62). This identity includes the volitional nature of human consciousness and the fact that human actions are the result of self-generated and self-sustaining action. The successionist theory of causality would hold that these internal processes are irrelevant to any notion of cause and effect. If social science researchers focus only on actions as resulting from other, antecedent actions, then causality is placed outside of the individual. Indeed, the individual becomes almost superfluous.

Most communication theories attribute the primary cause of human communication to the needs of interpersonal interaction. According to most of these theories, people communicate primarily in order to maintain social and cultural relationships.

Rules theorists, systems theorists, constructivists, self-awareness theorists, hermeneutic theorists, and even theorists approaching communication from a conceptual viewpoint look at communication from a perspective which sees this behavior as resulting from the interactions between people.

Many if not most of these theorists would strongly argue that their orientation is highly centered on the individual and his or her characteristics in opposition to what they view as a positivist approach which treats people as objects. Yet the kinds of research questions they ask and their view of the locus of communication as being outside of the individual and in the actions of the dyadic partners reflect a continued acceptance of the successionist view of causality which they share with much of natural science.

F. E. X. Dance's speech theory of human communication approaches the origin of communication from an ontological and phylogenetic angle. This theory centers on spoken language and holds that the main reason for the existence of communication is mentation. Dance states that while interaction is important, thought comes first in the transactional process, and it is through communication that people share their thoughts with others. As noted earlier, this is a minority position in the field of communication. It is, however, apparently the only one that affords implicit agreement with Aristotle's Law of Identity as applied to humans.

The physicist Heinz Pagels (1988) echoes this viewpoint when he says that "language is the instrument of thought...(and) thought is simply not identical to language" (p. 23). While linguists have tried to explain speech and action by looking at the rules for sentence construction which then cause that speech or action, sentences are, in fact, constructed as a response to a person's awareness (on whatever level) of a whole situation.

Though many philosophers have insisted that nothing exists except change and motion, the concept of change requires first the concepts of what changes and from what state to what state. As Ayn Rand pointed out, without the Law of Identity, the concept of change is not possible. In line with Dance's delineation of the speech theory of human communication, Rand (1967) states that:

Concepts and, therefore, language are primarily a tool of cognition -- not of communication, as is usually assumed. Communication is merely the consequence, not the cause nor the primary purpose of concept-formation.... Cognition precedes communication; the necessary precondition of communication is that one have something to communicate. (p. 92)

While the interactions which communication makes possible are, obviously, crucial for survival of the individual and the species, an application of the Law of Identity to human beings cannot help but recognize that the essential characteristic of humanity is the volitional nature of their consciousness and the actions which that consciousness requires for healthy functioning.

There are, of course, those in science who would reject this argument. They do not accept the belief that people do, in fact, possess volition, that this, indeed, does represent a distinguishing attribute of what it means to be a person. Yet as Branden has pointed out, any rejection of the volitional nature of human cognition results in an epistemological contradiction. A determinist theorist can ultimately only conclude that he believes what he does because he is forced to do so by influences -- however those influences may be identified -- which are beyond his control. In this case, there is no possibility to independently check his beliefs against reality to determine if the conclusions he has reached are true or false. Without an independent reasoning process, he has no way of freely validating -- judging the truth or falseness of -- his beliefs or making any knowledge claims at all. A determinist's statement that his position is the correct or "true" one is self-contradictory and epistemologically meaningless. It can therefore be dismissed. Whatever such a "scientist" is practicing, it is not science.

Recognition, then, of the primary causal force behind human communication and its location within the individual person will open new lines of inquiry and expand upon old ones. The nature of research in the field of communication is still coalescing. It is important that the courses charted take cognizance of the implicit philosophical assumptions which constrain those paths.

Whether one is delving into the reasons why someone engages in persuasive communication or into the motivating forces behind the establishment, maintenance, or dissolution of intimate relationships, by realizing that communication springs first from internal desires to express one's thoughts and feelings -- that all human behavior is caused, i.e., ultimately caused by the individual -- a researcher will find her or his studies framed and defined by what is and what is not possible for people to do according to their basic characteristics. The Law of Identity and the Law of Causality allow no exceptions. Individuals are free to try to ignore those laws. They are not free to escape the consequences of those actions. An understanding of these facts will lead social science researchers to ask the types of questions which will afford the greatest chance of uncovering the psychological and resultant communicative and behavioral principles which guide human behavior in any realm of interaction.

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